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Which differences between us are biological and which are caused by differences in 
learning, socialization, economics, upbringing, or, as it is sometimes generally 
called, culture? What is due to nature and what is due to nurture? These questions 
can seem important. They seem to matter for our self-conception!– for who we are 
and can hope to be. They seem to matter for resource distribution!– for which kind 
of research should be funded. And they seem to matter for policy-making! – for 
which kinds of interventions are feasible or promising.
Questions about the role of biology tend to divide those studying or researching 
the social sciences. On the one hand, there is biology attraction. People in this group 
feel the appeal of a novel, naturalistic paradigm that promises to transform and reju-
venate the social sciences. Biology attraction may be fueled by the hope for a uni"ed 
framework for understanding the human condition. On the other hand, there is 
biology repulsion. To the biology repelled, the rise to prominence of the life sciences 
at the university and in societal discourse feels like a hostile takeover that is at once 
naïve with regard to social science research and aggressive in its aspirations.
Public discourse a bout the relative contributions of biology and culture has a 
tendency to get politically charged. The biology attracted tend to view the biology 
repelled as avoiding reality in favor of well-willing ideology, as idealistic, and as 
driven by political rather than scienti"c motives.1 The biology repelled, by contrast, 
1 Cf. Baron-Cohen (2004, pp.!29–34).
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tend to think of the biology attracted as reactionary, as favoring conservative 
policies, and at worst as playing into the hands of racists and sexists.2
What then is due to biology and what is due to culture? What is due to nature and 
what is due to nurture? If you are enthralled by such questions about our biological 
differences, then you are probably confused!– or so I will argue. My goal is to diag-
nose the confusion.3 In debates about the role of biology in the social world, it is 
easy to ask the wrong questions, and it is easy to misinterpret the scienti"c research. 
My diagnosis will help to explain why emotions in these matters often run high and 
why the debate tends to get political.
In the "rst part of this chapter (section “Psychological Essentialism and How It 
Thinks of “Biological Differences””), I will draw on evidence that suggests that in 
the public understanding, reference to “biological,” “natural,” or “genetic” differ-
ences tends to be associated with an essentialist picture of human kinds. The evi-
dence suggests that because of a deeply rooted human psychological tendency 
called psychological essentialism, this picture has an easy grip on us. In public 
discussions of biology and culture or nature and nurture, it is the essentialist picture 
that dominates the debate, incites our emotions, and fuels the con#ict between the 
biology attracted and the biology repelled.
The essentialist picture is a serious distortion of what biological research really 
contributes to our understanding of human social behavior, as I will review in the 
second part of the chapter (section “Psychological Essentialism Deeply Distorts 
Biology”): the notion of an essential difference between some human populations 
(and populations of other organisms) is foreign to biological thinking; traits and 
behavior that are heritable need not therefore be genetically caused; and if a differ-
ence between two groups is genetically caused, this does not mean that the difference 
is not caused by social structures and that it cannot be changed by learning or social 
intervention; social mechanisms may be so deeply intertwined with other biological 
mechanism that it makes no sense to ask about their relative contributions.
 What Are “Biological Differences”?
 Men on!Steroids: An!Example
Let us start with an example of how the biology/culture (and the nature/nurture) dis-
tinction is sometimes used. The example illustrates how a network of concepts and 
terms regarding “biology,” “nature ”, “genes ”, “brain ”, “ hard wiring”, “neurosci-
2 Some of the debate between the biology attracted and the biology repelled has, for example, 
played out in the public discussion in Norway following the release of the 2010 documentary 
“Hjernevask” (Brainwash) co-produced by Harald Eia and Ole-Martin Ihle.
3 My discussion draws heavily on, summarizes, and connects the excellent work in Fausto-Sterling 




ence”, “innate ”, or “essential” tend to operate together in the popularization of 
biological explanations of social differences.4
The example concerns the biology of sex and gender. In a series of papers and 
popular books, neuroscientist and psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen distinguishes 
between a female and a male brain type. These types, it is argued, can be traced back 
to the different levels of testosterone produced by the male and the female fetus. 
Those fetal testosterone levels in#uence their brain development.5 The alleged result 
is a differentiation between the female brain, which is an empathizing brain “pre-
dominantly hardwired for empathy” (Baron-Cohen, 2004, p.!1), and the male brain, 
which is a systemizing brain “predominantly hardwired for understanding and 
building systems” (ibid.). Sex-linked genes (e.g., on the sex chromosomes, XX and 
XY), according to Baron-Cohen, may also be “a major determinant of the male and 
female brain types” (ibid., p.!198) possibly acting through testosterone secretion. 
We can thus “be con"dent that genes controlling empathizing and systemizing will 
be identi"ed” (ibid., p.! 199). Of course, “[g]enetically and/or hormonally based 
neural systems underlying empathizing and systemizing still require the right envi-
ronmental input (sensitive parenting, for example, in the case of empathizing) in 
order to develop normally. But identifying such genes or hormones will help us 
understand why, despite all the relevant environmental factors, some children are 
worse at empathizing, or better at systemizing, than others” (ibid.).
The claim that males and females have biologically different brains is argued to 
be an important part of the explanation of large-scale societal structures: female- 
brained people “make wonderful counselors, primary-school teachers, nurses, 
cares, mediators, group facilitators or personnel staff” (ibid., p.!185), while male- 
brained people “make the most wonderful scientists, engineers, mechanics, techni-
cians, musicians, architects, electricians, plumbers, taxonomists, …., programmers, 
or even lawyers” (ibid.). This (as Baron-Cohen also points out) "ts the contempo-
rary gender distribution in many modern societies: in 2011, in Norway, for example, 
89% of nurses and 83% of personal care workers were women, while 97% of 
machinery mechanics and 99% of building "nishers were men.6 Biological brain 
differentiation, according to Baron-Cohen, is an important part of the explanation of 
why men and women end up with different types of jobs. Baron-Cohen (2004) also 
4 I have deliberately chosen a popular science account that traces “social” structures and observa-
tions, as they are typically studied in economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, to their 
“biological” roots. The reason for this choice is that it is this kind of popular writing that is most 
likely directly encountered by most social scientists and humanities researchers, the one that is 
most directly in the public eye when it comes to debates regarding nature vs nurture, and the one 
where the problems I am interested in are often most pronounced.
5 Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, and Belmonte (2005) and Baron-Cohen (2002, 2004). For an in-
depth review of research on the role of testosterone for various types of social phenomena, see Fine 
(2017).
6 These data come from the of"cial statistics of Statistik Sentralbyrå Norway (Statistics Norway). 
See www.ssb.no/en/regsys (StatBank table 11411, www.ssb.no/en/table/11411) or the brochure 
“Men and Women in Norway 2018” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-
publikasjoner/women-and-men-in-norway-2018.
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hypothesizes that the male/female brain differentiation partially explains the persis-
tence of gender differences in math and physics education.7
This example illustrates an explanatory scheme. We start with something that 
seems clearly biological and independent of cultural or societal factors: here these 
are differences in genes and fetal hormone levels. These biological facts seem 
objectively measurable and clearly independent of any cultural or social factors 
(after all, the genetic makeup of an organism is determined at fertilization, and the 
hormone level differentiation occurs in the fetus already before most mothers, or 
anyone else, even know the gender or sex of their future child). In a second step, this 
biological factor is then argued to cause a similarly biological difference in brain 
development. In this case, there is stronger cross-hemispheric connectivity and acti-
vation in female brains and stronger intra-hemispheric connectivity and activation 
in male brains. The fetal hormonal difference brings about a “hard-wired” differ-
ence in the very structure of the brain. Third, these differences in brain anatomy and 
activation patterns lead to functional differences, i.e., differences in psychological 
traits and strategies. Here these are strengths in either empathy or systemizing. 
Fourth, the difference in psychological capacities in turn is supposed to scale up: 
individual psychological differences have societal consequences. If men and women 
have different psychological capacities, and use different psychological strategies, 
this, it is argued, must be part of the explanation for why they, for example, tend to 
be found in different occupations. Finally, we are offered a deeper evolutionary 
explanation for why the genetic differentiation with its social and behavioral conse-
quences exists (see Fn. 7). The populations have different genes because they 
responded to different evolutionary selection pressures. The explanatory scheme 
thus moves from evolutionary history, over anatomy and physiology, to psychologi-
cal differentiation and to social patterns.
7 Baron-Cohen also offers some evolutionary speculation as to why do people have such different 
brain types (of the systemizing or the empathizing kind): Baron-Cohen suggests that such brains 
“have been selected [by evolution] as specializations for entirely different goals and niches” 
(Baron-Cohen, 2004, p.!225). The male, systemizing, brain type was good for “using and making 
tools,” especially weapons, that could, for example, “have been a major advantage in male–male 
competition” (ibid., p.! 203); it was good for hunting, and trading, gaining higher social status 
(which makes males attractive for females); to acquire and exercise social dominance, is linked to 
aggression, makes men tolerate solitude, specialized experts, and successful leaders. All these are 
aspects of the evolutionary niche of the human male. The female empathizing brain type, by con-
trast, Baron-Cohen suggests, was good for mothering (females, who Baron-Cohen thinks were the 
principal caregivers, may thus have evolved an empathizing brain); it is also good for making and 
keeping friends! – the kind reciprocal relationships important to females who need community 
stability given the resources they invest in children and parenting; relatedly, an empathizing brain 
makes you good at participating in gossip which stabilizes dependable alliances, integrate into 
novel social groups (like the family of a male partner); it helps a female understand and be compas-
sionate toward her partner and thus provide her with “a better chance of keeping her relationship 
stable during her offspring’s vulnerable years, thus promoting their survival and the spread of her 
genes” (ibid., p.!223). The empathizing brain is thus hypothesized to be perfect for the female 
evolutionary niche. Baron-Cohen offers comparatively little scienti"c support for these specula-
tions. For a powerful critique of such “evolutionary psychology” speculations, see Richardson 
(2010). Richardson shows how such speculations fall dramatically short of accepted standards in 
biology. See also Laland and Brown (2011).
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This explanatory scheme no doubt, at least to the biologically attracted, appears 
powerful. Are we supposed to simply reject the evidence that male and female 
fetuses are exposed to different levels of testosterone? Are we simply supposed to 
ignore the genetic differences between men and women? Are we supposed to think 
that psychology has nothing to do with brain activation? Or are we supposed to 
think the psychological tendencies of individuals play no role in the explanation of 
which occupations certain groups of people tend to choose? Each step of the argu-
mentative scheme can seem irresistible. In light of the availability of explanatory 
schemes exempli"ed here by Baron-Cohen’s research, it can seem that one indeed 
would have to be “brain-washed” to reject that “biological sex-differences must 
play an important role in explaining why [for example] Norwegian women and men 
to such a large degree choose “traditional” educations, professions, and career strat-
egies” (my translation) as the biology-attracted sociologist Gunnar Aakvaag (2015) 
suggests in a recent newspaper article.
 What Is a!“Biological Difference”?
What are the “biological sex differences” Aakvaag and others are talking about? 
While public debate about the relative contribution of biology and culture, or of 
nature and nurture, can be heated, what is at issue is often discussed very little; it is 
taken as implicitly understood. Glancing reference to the type of writing exempli-
"ed by Baron-Cohen, if even that, tends to be all that is felt needed to get the discus-
sion going. But let us step back and ask:
When is a difference between groups of people a “biological” difference?
One way of understanding something to be “biological” is that it is the kind of 
thing that is studied in biology or in the biological sciences.
It seems unlikely that this is how the participants in the relevant public debates 
understand the issue. Biology is a multifaceted "eld with boundaries that aren’t 
clearly delineated. In nonhuman organisms, any sex differentiation in (social) 
behavior, population structures, ontogenetic development, cellular and molecular 
mechanisms, neuronal processes, evolution, and more would be studied in the bio-
logical sciences. Researchers in biology may, when useful, use methods that origi-
nated in the social sciences (like game theory, "rst employed in economics). Further, 
most lay participants in the relevant public debates will not know where disciplinary 
boundaries are drawn in the academy and what methods are used where; and most 
academic participants will be cognizant of the #uency of methodologies and aca-
demic disciplines. When “how much is due to biology?” sounds deep and interest-
ing and incites public debate, it is unlikely that it means “how much can be studied 
in the biological sciences? ” It must mean something else.
Another approach is to focus not on what biological differences are but on the 
pragmatic effects of appealing to the “biological.”8 In this regard one might 
8 With regard to human “nature,” Maria Kronfeldner (2018) makes this argument in detail.
4 Culture or Biology? If This Sounds Interesting, You!Might Be!Confused
50
emphasize, correctly I believe, that the concepts at issue are “essentially con-
tested” (Gallie, 1956), because they mark domains of epistemic authority. The 
fact that their descriptive meaning is hard to pin down contributes to their con-
tested nature. People are ready to "ght vigorously over what about us is nature or 
what is biological because the use of these terms delineates who counts as an 
expert in the domain, who gets resources for its study and for changes or “treat-
ment” in the domain, and therefore who gets power with respect to shaping soci-
etal discourse, setting agendas, and in the end also in policy-making.
I believe that their pragmatic function to delineate domains of epistemic author-
ity is indeed an important aspect of why disputes about “nature” or “biology” have 
a tendency to become heated. But it doesn’t yet explain what kind of epistemic 
authority “biology” indicates. Why does it sound more interesting (and more con-
troversial) to ask which of our differences are “biological” than to ask which are 
“psychological” (and hence make specialists in psychology experts), “physical” 
(thus falling to the expertise of physicists), or “economical” (thus being the domain 
of economists)? In other words, why does appeal to the “biological” signal a special 
epistemic authority, especially when it comes to human differences?
 Psychological Essentialism and!How It Thinks of!“Biological 
Differences”
 Psychological Essentialism
In order to better understand both the attraction and the controversial nature of 
appeals to the “biological,” I will argue in this section that we need to understand 
how it is integrated into an important aspect of our psychology. I will argue that the 
idea of “biological differences” and contributions of “nature” "ts well and gets 
quickly incorporated into a highly intuitive (albeit false, I should already now say) 
tendency for thinking about human kinds. “Biological differences” are intuitively 
understood as differences in the internal, unchanging, and immutable essence of 
different kinds of people. Much of the public controversy, in my diagnosis, is fueled 
by the fact that its participants argue or are perceived as arguing about the viability 
and the reach of essences!– often in vague and inarticulate ways. It is the essentialist 
picture that generates the strong emotions on both poles of biology attraction and 
biology repulsion.
In this section, I will review some of what is known about this intuitive essential-
ist way of thinking. In the next section, I will then show how and why “biology” 
gets co-opted by that way of thinking.
Psychological essentialism is a set of tendencies for how non-experts, including 
children as young as 3–5!years old, tend to group the members of certain kinds of 
individuals together on the basis of hypothesized, underlying, though unknown, 
features (cf. Gelman, 2003). This underlying “nature” is thought to make the 
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individual the kind of individual it is and causes it to normally have its observable 
properties. Psychological essentialism is thought to be an important aspect of how 
people tend to think about both natural and social kinds. It describes an important 
aspect of our intuitive way of thinking about classi"cation; it is what we do unre-
#ectively, quickly, and automatically (and, thus, independently of exposure to real 
scienti"c research). Psychological essentialism has been shown to apply to natural 
substances like water or gold, biological categories like animal and plant types, but 
also social categories like race and gender (on which more below); it does normally 
not apply to artifact kinds like types of furniture or tools. Psychological essentialism 
appears to be a fairly universal aspect of human psychology and has been shown to 
exist in human communities around the globe (Gelman, 2003 and Heine, Dar- 
Nimrod, Cheung, & Proulx, 2017 for recent reviews).9
The tendencies described by psychological essentialism show up in how people 
classify individuals, explain, and make predictions. According to psychological 
essentialism, people implicitly posit an essence for a kind of being; they are said to 
“essentialize” a kind to the degree to which their intuitive thinking about that kind 
is governed by roughly the following features (cf. Heine et!al., 2017):
First, essences are held to be substantially and often quite radically immutable. Given the 
immutable essence of the kind, even radical transformations therefore will not change what 
the individual fundamentally is: a caterpillar that develops into a butter#y remains a mem-
ber of the same kind, even though its outward appearance has changed radically (Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991). Importantly, this includes radical changes in the 
individual’s environment, its upbringing, and its social encounters: children believe that a 
kangaroo will forever retain its kangaroo nature even if it grows up among goats (Gelman 
& Wellman, 1991).10
Second, essences are held to be internal and deep within the organism. Children hold 
that essences are normally invisible. Changing the inside of an organism, children believe, 
is more likely to affect its essence than changes to its outward appearances (Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991).
Third, essences!– while invisible to the naked eye!– are accessible to experts. As a result, 
“[c]hildren [, for example,] readily accept experimenter-provided labels, even when such 
labels are surprising and counterintuitive” (Gelman, 2003). Children hold that an expert like 
the experimenter knows best how to classify individuals. They defer to the expert’s!knowl-
edge of essence in their classi"catory practices.
Fourth, essences tend to be all or nothing. Essentializing a kind therefore leads to 
boundary intensi!cation. While children readily accept that a penguin is an atypical bird, it 
is still “de"nitely” a bird (Gelman, 2003). While for non-essentialized kinds, such as arti-
facts, people tend to hold that something can be a member of a kind to some degree but not 
fully (it’s sort of a chair, but sort of a sofa too; sort of like a car and sort of like a motorbike); 
people tend to make fairly extreme category membership judgments about essentialized 
kinds even when they accept that an individual is an atypical member (Gelman, 2003). 
9 As shown in these reviews, the extent of these essentialist tendencies does vary with a number of 
other factors, e.g., socioeconomic status, and is more widespread in some populations than in oth-
ers, e.g., Europeans vs East Asians.
10 Note though that the essentialist beliefs about possible transformations for an individual are 
interestingly constrained: already 3-year-olds hold that a smaller animal cannot be a grown-up 
stage of a bigger animal (Gelman, 2003, p.!65).
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Children may think that penguins are atypical birds, but they do not think that they are sort 
of a bird and sort of something else.
Fifth, essences can be transferred from one individual to another. This is so especially 
through biological parenthood: Gelman and Wellman (1991) as well as Heyman and 
Gelman (2000), for example, show that already young children believe that infants (human 
and animal) inherit some aspects of their essence from their biological parents even when 
they are adopted and grow up in a different environment.
All of these tendencies for essentializing kinds are present in children long before 
they learn anything about the biological sciences, are present also in communities 
that have not been exposed to those sciences, and govern also adult intuitive classi"-
catory judgments.
Essentializing occurs especially for kinds we think and talk about a lot. Highly 
essentialized kinds tend to correspond to our subjectively preferred taxonomy, to 
what Eleanor Rosch has called the “basic level” of categorization (Rosch, 1978; cf. 
Leslie 2017 for discussion): the kinds for which names, for example, are learned 
"rst or for which we can list the highest number of distinguishing or salient features. 
Our preferred way of carving up the world appears to be in terms of these basic level 
highly essentialized kinds.
Why do we essentialize kinds? Psychological essentialism with respect to bio-
logical kinds, while deeply mistaken with regard to real biological thinking (as I 
will argue below), serves useful functions: it allows us to ef"ciently and quickly 
draw inferences regarding which appearances, forms of behavior, and other impor-
tant properties will tend to come together. Because they are psychological essential-
ists, “[p]eople expect the disparate properties of a species to be integrally linked 
without having to know precise causal relationships” (Atran, 1998). Such a power-
ful set of inferences would otherwise be unavailable. Inductive inferences about the 
unobserved can be made on the basis of a few observations and knowledge of kind 
membership. By simply taking terms to stand for essentialized kinds, children can 
draw on community knowledge (or bias!) for their own generalizations since in the 
very use of the term expert (or guru!) knowledge gets encoded.
On evolutionary time scales, psychological essentialism may have become an 
important feature of human cognition because it was such a practically ef"cient 
inductive tool. It may have been evolutionarily available and bene"cial for humans 
because of how sociality (including information sharing, extensive learning, and 
teaching), intelligence, and language use co-evolved in the human lineage (cf. 
Pinker, 2010). As Atran (1998) argues, psychological essentialism may have been 
biologically adaptive in our thinking about the organismic world, because it 
increased the ef"ciency of inferential reasoning in the biological domain at fairly 
low evolutionary costs: the individual differences between the members of an ani-
mal or plant kind often matter much less than what is shared between them. Under 
most circumstances, it is much more important to know that “lions have manes,” 
that “bugs are disgusting,” or that “the hemlock is poisonous” in order to avoid 
death and disease than to know about the many individual differences in appearance 
and behavior. By encoding psychological essentialism into the most easily acquired 
linguistic terms, we were able to make quick and powerful generalizations exactly 
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when it comes to the most striking and!– for our community!– most important fea-
tures of the world.
How and when the use of language supports essentializing is not extremely well 
understood. There is some evidence, though, that suggests that an essentialist 
understanding is encouraged both by the use of generic sentences and by the use of 
noun phrases (see Leslie 2017 for a review and further references). Generic sen-
tences are sentences of the form “Fs are G” or “The F is G,” e.g., “Lions have 
manes.” They are to be contrasted with explicitly quanti"ed sentences like “Some 
lions have manes,” “Many lions have manes,” or “All lions have manes.” Evidence 
suggest that the use of generics contributes to essentializing the kind. Noun phrases 
are used in sentences like “Simba is a lion” and are opposed to the use of verb 
phrases like “Simba has fur.” Children will essentialize more if a property is intro-
duced by a noun phrase rather than a verb phrase (“is a carrot eater” vs “eats car-
rots”). The use of noun phrases and generic language thus can serve as linguistic 
means for transmitting essentialist attitudes in the community and across genera-
tions (Leslie, 2013).
Essentialist tendencies are known to be prevalent also when it comes to kinds of 
human or social categories.11 In this case, essences and their consequences are 
attributed to certain types of people. Among the most essentialized human kinds are 
gender, race, ethnicity, and disability (cf. Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). On 
an intuitive level, already young children (but also adults) thus tend to implicitly 
accept the following ideas about humans:
 1. Human individuals come in kinds that differ in their essences (some human 
kinds have essences).
 2. The essence of a kind of human delineates sharp boundaries between groups of 
individuals (intermediary cases are impossible).
 3. The essence of a kind of human consists in an internal feature shared by each 
individual of that kind (essences are internal).
 4. Essences are invisible to the naked eye or casual observation: they are located 
deep within each individual (essences are invisible).
 5. Essences can be known by experts, to whom non-experts will tend to defer when 
it comes to placing individuals into kinds of human (essences are known to 
experts).
 6. Essences cannot be changed through the life span of an individual: they remain 
the same through changes in the individual’s development or its physical or 
social environment (essences are immutable).
 7. Internal essences causally determine a type-typical outward appearance and 
behavior. Other (developmental or environmental) causal factors shaping indi-
vidual appearance and behavior can be separated from the causal role of essences 
and explain only deviations from the type-typical appearance and behavior 
(essences are separable causes).
11 Rothbart and Taylor (1992); see also Prentice and Miller (2007) for a fairly recent overview.
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Consider gender (cf. Bohan, 1993; Gelman & Taylor, 2000; Haslam et!al., 2000): 
already young children tend to think that the differences between men and women 
re#ect an underlying difference in internal features that make someone either a man 
or a woman (Taylor, 1996). Men have one kind of internal essence. Women have 
another. This essence (what makes someone a man or a woman) is not visible to 
casual observations. The essentialist child accepts that some men look like women 
and behave like them. But deeply within a man will always remain a man (and a 
woman, however much she dresses and behaves like a man, will always remain a 
woman). While a person’s hair color may change through processes like dying and 
aging or through external factors like exposure to sunlight (since the kind “blond” 
or “dark-haired” is not strongly essentialized), children tend to think that whether a 
person is a man or a woman is not something that can change through her lifetime 
(once a woman always a woman). Further, children think that there is a sharp bound-
ary between men and women. While someone can be sort of blond and sort of dark- 
haired (maybe they have some blond and some dark hairs; maybe their hair color 
falls in-between in some way), no one can be sort of a man and sort of a woman. 
Even if they are an atypical man, in many ways behaving and looking much like a 
woman, they are de"nitely a man (or they are de"nitely a woman). The boundary 
between men and women gets intensi"ed. Finally, already young children believe 
that the behavior and appearance of a gendered person are partially due to effects of 
their gendered essence (whether they “really” are a man or a woman) and partially 
due to effects of how the person grew up and the environment they live in (a man 
may grow long hair or behave like a woman if he is surrounded by women or social-
ized in a certain way; but!– children think!– their nature as a man in the end can be 
determined by an expert).
This way of thinking about gender!– as an essentialized kind!– then is something 
that most of us "nd intuitive already when we are 5!years old and that we all con-
tinue to "nd intuitive even as adults. It is a re#ection of a deeply rooted, evolution-
arily old, and adaptive way of thinking about many aspects of the biological and 
social world.
 Interpreting Biology as!Concerned with!Essences
It is therefore with those essentialist tendencies in them that lay people, but also 
many academics, hear about (popular representations of) research on our biological 
differences and approach the question of what is due to nature and what is due to 
nurture. In this section, I argue that there is good reason to think that they will map 
the new terminology to that already familiar way of thinking: what is due to biology 
or nature in a kind of person is understood as what is due to the essence of the rel-
evant kind. By contrast what is due to culture or nurture is what does not spring 
from this essence.
“Fetal hormone levels,” “genes,” and “hard-wired” brain structures intuitively 
are an excellent "t for the role of essences. They are internal, invisible, and known 
to experts but not lay people; they are biological inherited, are portrayed as unaffected 
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by environmental factors, and have important and intuitively separable effects on 
observable appearances and behavior. While not all popular writers are as explicit as 
Baron-Cohen in their claim to uncover “essential differences,” I claim that espe-
cially lay participants in the public debate about “biological differences” or “nature” 
and “nurture” often intuitively understand the debate as being about whether to 
accept an essentialist picture of the relevant kinds of human. In Baron-Cohen’s writ-
ings, we see, for example, a heavy emphasis on “types” (of brains and people) that 
are “determined” or “controlled” by fetal hormones and genes. These “types” can 
develop “normally” or abnormally, and the “right” environmental input is needed to 
get out the type-typical appearance or behavior, the one that is “supposed to” be the 
result!– given the relevant essence.
In a number of studies, Dar-Nimrod, Heine, and colleagues (cf. Dar-Nimrod & 
Heine, 2011; Heine et! al., 2017) have argued that people associate genes with 
essences. They argue that people tend to view genes as the materialization of 
unknown essences and are ready to transfer their intuitive categorization device to 
this scienti"c concept. Genes are internally located, can be transferred from parent 
to (biological) child, are unchanged through development and transformation of 
appearance and environment, are discovered by experts, and are supposed to explain 
many outward properties. “Because of this overlap with people’s essentialist intu-
itions, we submit,” so Heine et! al. (2017), “that when most people are thinking 
about genes they are not really thinking about genes!– they are thinking about meta-
physical essences.” It is thus no wonder that people are ready to view the power of 
genes in an almost mystical fashion (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995) and are very quick to 
explain all kinds of conditions in terms of those “genes”: after all, here the experts 
are speaking about our deep nature that we were attuned to from early childhood!on.
The gene-essence association, Heine et!al. (op. cit) argue, leads to a number of 
(mis)conceptions about genes.
Given that genes qua essences are internal and immutable, we cannot change how 
they affect appearance and behavior. If a condition or behavior is caused by genes, it 
is therefore thought to be outside our control. Studies show that when non- experts 
read about the genetic origins of some condition or tendency, they will tend to form 
fatalistic attitudes toward that condition or tendency, i.e., they will tend to treat it as 
relatively unchangeable, and less subject to choice: people who read about research 
describing “obesity genes,” for example, tend to eat more cookies afterward, com-
pared to those who read research about how social networks affect obesity or those 
who read about non-obesity-related research (Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, Ruby, & Heine, 
2014). Given that genes are viewed as essences, their effect is thought to be what is 
independent of environmental (including social and developmental) conditions.12
12 Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, and Duberstein (2013), in a related study, focus on the effects of 
(apparently) learning that one has an “alcoholism gene.” They show that this leads participants to 
experience negative affect and lack of control over drinking. Similar results are found in more 
complex domains: people who are led to think that learning styles (how someone learns most ef"-
ciently) have genetic causes tend to think that they have no control over their own learning style 
and that learning is best when learning styles are matched between teacher and student (see Heine 
et!al., 2017).
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Relatedly, people also have a tendency to think that if a condition has a genetic 
cause, it does not have another (e.g., environmental) cause as well. Genetic causes 
dominate other causes and exclude them. If obesity is genetic, people tend to think, 
then it does not matter how much you eat; either you become obese or not!– inde-
pendently of your behavior.
If someone believes that gender differences are biological, we would therefore 
expect that they think that these differences spring from the relevant essence of the 
gendered kind. And if they spring from those essences, they cannot be changed and 
have to be accepted as a given that is outside human control (just like for obesity). 
And this is exactly what has been found. Brescoll and LaFrance (2004) tested how 
subjects reacted to being presented with a biological rather than a cultural or social 
explanation of gender differences and found that “exposure to biological explana-
tions signi"cantly increased participants’ endorsement of gender stereotypes” 
(p.!515). Similarly, Coleman and Hong (2008) found that an endorsement of a “bio-
logical gender theory [was] … linked to [a] stronger gender self-stereotyping ten-
dency” (p.!34) (as re#ected by greater endorsements of negative feminine traits and 
slower reaction time in denying stereotypic feminine traits). They found further that 
“this relationship holds even when the participants’ sexist attitudes were statistically 
controlled” (ibid.).
Exposure to biological or cultural explanations of gender differences does not 
only in#uence people’s explicit attitudes (whether they endorse a stereotype), there 
is also evidence that it affects people’s performance on stereotyped tasks (Dar- 
Nimrod & Heine, 2006): in their experiment, women did a math test, after reading 
essays that they were told tested for reading comprehension. If those essays argued 
for a biological gender theory, then women’s math scores were signi"cantly lower 
than when those essays argued for a cultural, experience-based explanation. Indeed, 
exposure to the biological theory signi"cantly lowered math scores compared to 
reading an essay on a neutral topic.
If people intuitively associate “biological” explanations as concerned with inter-
nal metaphysical essences, we can explain why the acceptance of such explanations 
leads to a fatalistic attitude with regard to the status quo.13 What is biological is what 
cannot be changed through social means like education, and therefore we simply 
need to accept those biological differences as an immutable given. If it is a “biologi-
cal” fact that women are bad at math, then!– if you are a woman!– it is not even 
worth trying. If sex differences are “biological,” then they are essential to who we 
are, and therefore we must accept their type-typical results. Exposure to claims 
about a “hard-wired” or “biological” difference between male and female brains, 
since those claims are interpreted as concerning essences, therefore “quite indepen-
dently of their scienti"c validity, have scope to sustain the very sex differences they 
seek to explain” (Fine, 2012).
13 Related to boundary intensi"cation, people who view a human kind as largely homogenous, and 
importantly and fundamentally distinct from other kinds, tend to also view membership in that 
kind as genetically caused.
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Let us then look, returning to our case study, at how someone who is already!– 
and has been from early childhood!– a psychological essentialist would encounter 
Baron-Cohen’s writings.
His 2004 book, the most popular exposition of his scienti"c research, of course 
is titled The Essential Difference (presumably referring to the “male and female 
brains” of the book’s subtitle; but easily understood as holding between men and 
women as such: the book’s Penguin edition cover, after all, showcases not brains but 
a man and a woman and their “typical” thoughts). Essential differences between the 
male and female mind (note the generic formulation) are again prominently men-
tioned at the beginning of the acknowledgments; a contrast is drawn between the 
claim that some of the observed differences between “the mind of men and women” 
(note the use of generics again) “re#ect … differences in “essence” (p.!157)14 as 
opposed to cultural factors. “Biological factors are the only other candidates” 
(p.!166) other than those cultural factors. Biology, in Baron-Cohen’s writings, gets 
associated directly with the essence of man and woman (and their minds).
It is not only the explicit appeal to “essences” that triggers an essentialist reading 
of Baron-Cohen’s exposition of his research.
Throughout the book, he uses the language of types of brains, thus strongly sug-
gesting that population differences in neuroanatomy and neuronal processes can be 
traced to a difference between two types of brains (“the male brain type” and “the 
female brain type” or “brain type E” (for empathizing) and “brain type S” (for 
systemizing).15 To speak of “types” suggests a deep and fundamental difference “in 
nature” (or who would speak, unless half-jokingly, of the blond and the dark-haired 
type of person).
The book is further full of generic language, often speaking of “the male brain” 
or “the female brain,” but also of what women or men generically are like, do, or 
have evolved to do (in sentences without explicit quanti"ers like “some,” “all,” or 
“many”). As we have seen, there is evidence to suggest that use of such generics will 
encourage essentializing the relevant kinds, and that generics are easily accepted on 
the basis of just a few striking instances, but tend to lead to overgeneralization to a 
large proportion of the essentialized kind.
Of course, Baron-Cohen also, at various places in the book, emphasizes that he 
is “only talking about statistical averages” (p.!20; see also p.!27, 185), that not all 
men have “the male brain type” and that not all women have “the female brain 
type,” and that “your sex does not dictate your brain type.” Unlike stereotyping, he 
stresses, “science recognizes that many people fall outside the average range for 
their group” (p.!28). But the psychological essentialist easily acknowledges such 
14 Scare quotes around “essence” are in the original. I suspect, though cannot show this, that with 
the use of the quotation marks, Baron-Cohen here shows some awareness that appeal to “essences” 
is considered scienti"cally unacceptable in the biological sciences. But note that he seems to be 
also!happy to quite explicitly take the shortcut to get his readers to understand the distinction he 
aims to draw.
15 The latter sounds more scienti"c than the former, but Baron-Cohen clearly associates them 
strongly and often combines the terminology, speaking, e.g., of a “male brain type S” (p.!20).
4 Culture or Biology? If This Sounds Interesting, You!Might Be!Confused
58
variations: their (implicit) view is an essence plus variations picture. Some members 
of an essentialized kind might appear and behave quite differently from the kind 
type, due to unusual circumstances, cover-up, or lack of “the right environment 
input” (Baron-Cohen, 2004, p.!1999). What all members of the kind share is an 
internal disposition (the essence) that could but need not manifest itself. To some-
one disposed to psychological essentialism, talk of “statistical averages” is therefore 
naturally interpreted as noisy variation around the norm for the “group” which is 
identi"ed as the separable causal upshot of the type essence. And of course, psycho-
logical essentialists are ready to be corrected by experts. They do not, after all, think 
that essences can be directly predicted based on appearances or outward behavior. 
What outwardly looks like a man thus might well have inside its skull “the 
female type.”
The psychological essentialist who is exposed to Baron-Cohen’s work thus gets 
ample apparent evidence that the reported scienti"c research has uncovered the 
metaphysical essence of males and females (and the male and female mind) and has 
a ready interpretation for those places where strict boundaries appear to be denied.
 Explaining the!Controversy
We have seen evidence that psychological essentialism is deeply rooted in human 
psychology and that humans!– including and especially children and lay people!– 
think of differences between some human kinds, such as the difference between 
men and women, along essentialist lines, long before and independently of whether 
they have ever been exposed to biological research.
We have also seen evidence that psychological essentialism gets easily co-opted 
into an interpretation of biological research on differences between human popula-
tions. Differences described in terms of “genes,” “hormone levels,” or those that are 
“hard-wired” tend to be understood as differences that are due to differences in the 
essences of the relevant kind. The way we all tend to intuitively understand “bio-
logical differences” thus is as differences of essence, while those differences that 
are not biological (especially social or cultural differences) are the ones that are not 
due to a difference in the essence between the relevant kinds and in this sense merely 
accidental. What is biological thus cannot be changed through education or social 
arrangements, while other differences can be changed through such means.
This explains why appeal to our “biology” carries special epistemic authority. 
While we may not know exactly what is biological and what is not, it matters deeply 
what is part of biology and what is “merely” social: what is biological is what carves 
human kinds along their essential joints. Experts in the “biology” of sex and gender 
thus are intuitively understood as experts in what makes gendered people the kind of 
people they are. Since the difference between what is essential and what is not essen-
tial is so important and yet hidden from the observation of behavior and appearances, 
it is going to be highly contested what falls on which side. We can thus explain the 
contested character of the concept of a “biological difference.” The difference 
S. Watzl
59
between nature (or biology) and nurture (or culture) seems deep and important 
exactly because it aligns with the difference between essence and accidents that 
psychological essentialism gives us.
We have also seen that this essentialist thinking has social consequences: since 
what is essential is immutable, people are not motivated to try to change or counter-
act what is due to biology (it can after all not be fundamentally changed but only 
“covered up” in its effect on behavior or appearances). Biological differences are 
thus seen as differences that form a neutral and objective background against which 
all policy making or social arrangement must be taking place and not themselves as 
differences that can be affected or even eradicated by changes in social arrangements.
This way of aligning the essentially unchangeable with what is biological, inter-
nal, hidden, and given from parents to offspring, as we have seen, is present already 
in young children. It is not a scienti"c discovery that there are “essential differ-
ences” between men and women. Children and lay people already believed that 
there are exactly such differences and stood all too ready to believe that biology 
unearthed them in its talk of genes, hormones, and brain wirings. Those who defend 
biological differences between, say, men and women are thus understood as defend-
ing an unchanging and unchangeable difference in the essence of the type “man” 
and the type “woman.” If differences in which professions men and women tend to 
choose are due to “biology,” it is thus understood that such differences will not dis-
appear, whatever social arrangements we may come up with (and the same for dif-
ferences in math performance or empathy).
It is thus no wonder that those with a progressive political view will be opposed 
to “biology”: the more is seen as due to biology, the more about us cannot be 
changed and thus presumably is not worth trying to change. Those who advocate 
social change thus won’t like “biology.” By contrast, those with a conservative polit-
ical viewpoint will be happy to see the realm of the “biological” increase. After all, 
it supports their view that certain aspects of how things are should not be subject for 
attempted changed (after all, they cannot be changed, and so its hubris to try to 
change them).
The essentialist understanding of our “biological differences” thus explains why 
debates about them get the hearts racing and have a tendency to become political. 
They are debates about what should be taken as a given background and what is 
amenable for social change. We have a fairly well-developed psychological expla-
nation for why the nature/nurture or biology/culture debate seems deep and 
important.
 Psychological Essentialism Deeply Distorts Biology
Psychological essentialism explains why the question about our “biological differ-
ences” psychologically seems to us deep and important. Is the picture of the world 
of organisms (including humans) provided to us by psychological essentialism 
even halfway adequate? Do kinds of organisms have essences of roughly the sort 
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psychological essentialism tells us they do? Is the picture of genes, hormone levels, 
and brain wiring as corresponding to essences a roughly correct picture of how real 
biological research thinks of them? The answer, I will argue in this section, is no. 
Essentialism of the kind we have encountered is a serious misrepresentation of 
biological research.
 There Are No Internal Biological Essences
While, as we have seen, appeal to “biological differences” in public discussion and 
in popular books like Baron-Cohen’s tends to be closely associated with differences 
in “essences,” it is almost universally accepted within biology that no population of 
organisms (no kind of organism) has anything like the intrinsic, internal, and immu-
table essence psychological essentialists intuitively posit. Ernst Mayr, one of most 
in#uential biologists of the twentieth century, famously contrasted “typological 
thinking,” which he found in the philosophical tradition of Plato and Aristotle, with 
the “population thinking” that characterizes modern biology. He writes that, accord-
ing to biology,
[a]ll organisms and organic phenomena are composed of unique features and can be 
described collectively only in statistical terms. Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, 
form populations of which we can determine the arithmetic mean and statistics of variation. 
Averages are merely statistical abstractions, only the individuals of which the populations 
are composed have reality. The ultimate conclusions of the population thinker and of the 
typologist are precisely the opposite. For the typologist, the type (eidos) is real and the 
variation an illusion, while for the populationist the type (average) is an abstraction and 
only the variation is real. No two ways of looking at nature could be more different. (Mayr, 
1959, p.!2)
The population thinking that Mayr describes here is!diametrically opposed to the 
essentialist picture. Mayr’s view that an evolutionary and biological approach to 
humans and other organisms is not compatible with essentialism about the relevant 
kinds is widely shared among biologists and philosophers of biology. With regard to 
what biology thinks about the idea of “human nature,” another in#uential biologist, 
Michael Ghiselin, sums the idea up as follows: “What does evolution teach us about 
human nature? It teaches us that human nature is a superstition” (Ghiselin, 1997, 
p.!1). The widespread evolutionary consensus against essentialism is not speci"c to 
humans; it applies to all biological kinds. With regard to whether biological spe-
cies!– the paradigm of essentialized kinds for those in the grips of psychological 
essentialism!– have internal essences, philosopher of biology Eliot Sober (1994) 
says “essentialism about species is today a dead issue” (p.!163; cited also in Okasha, 
2002, p.!191).
Why is this? As Samir Okasha (2002, p.!196) puts it, “[e]mpirically, it simply is 
not true that the groups of organisms that working biologists treat as con-speci"c 
share a set of common morphological, physiological or genetic traits which set them 
off from other species.” There is a lot of intra-species genetic variation, often more 
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than between species, and while many members of a species share certain genetic 
features, there is no set of genes that makes an individual a member of that species. 
Indeed, such genetic variation within all populations is essential for the operation 
of processes of natural selection, and therefore such variation “is fundamental to the 
Darwinian explanation of organic diversity” (Okasha, op.! cit., p.! 197). The 
Darwinian view of organismic populations has no room for distinguishing essential 
aspects of a kind of organism from their accidental features.
Biological species, like Homo sapiens, are not de"ned by any essential features 
shared by all of their members but rather are individuated by reference to their place 
in the tree of life (they are the result of speciation events) and certain types of inter-
actions that are possible between the members of the species (typical reproduction). 
Whether an individual is a human thus, biological, has little to do with its intrinsic 
characteristics, but rather with its historical connection to a certain constantly 
changing, evolving, population.
While there are heated controversies within biology and the philosophy of biol-
ogy about how best to think about species and the species concept, what is almost 
universally accepted is that biological species are not individuated by an internal 
essence that all of its members share. There are no tiger genes located deep within 
(the cells of) each tiger that make that individual a tiger. There is also no set or clus-
ter of tiger genes. There is no internal, intrinsic property that makes something a 
tiger.16 Psychological essentialism thus delivers a deeply wrong picture of species.
What holds for species also holds for other biological kinds. Speci"cally, it holds 
for sex differences. Psychological essentialism is also deeply wrong about the kind 
“male” or “female.” Males and females do not have anything like the essences the 
psychological essentialist posits.
First, it is important to note that sex differentiation is not uniform across the 
organismic world. It is highly diverse and far from universal. Most organisms, espe-
cially the prokaryotes, do not reproduce sexually at all or have more than two sexes; 
many!– especially plants!– use sexual reproduction only occasionally; there are a 
good number of animal species where sex is determined through the environment 
(in crocodiles and some turtles, e.g., sex is determined by the temperature in which 
an egg is incubated), in stark contrast to the internal determination of the male or 
female kind the psychological essentialist believes in. Further, several animal spe-
cies can and do change their sex within their life span (in many snails but also in 
some "sh), in contrast to the immutability of essences posited by psychological 
essentialism. Even in those organisms where sex is stable over the life span and 
more dependent on internal features, there is a variety of sex-determining mecha-
nisms rather than the uniformity of types suggested by the essentialist picture: in 
16 Note that this does not mean that there is no sense in which species have essences. It is compat-
ible with the denial of classical essentialism about species (of the kind psychological essentialism 
appeals to) that species have, for example, historical and/or relational essences: what makes some-
thing a tiger is its relationship to other organism, both at a time (with regard to possible biological 
reproduction) and over time (as a member of a certain biological lineage). See Okasha (2002) for 
more discussion.
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insects like bees and ants (hymenoptera), for example, unfertilized eggs become 
males, while fertilized eggs generally became females; and even those that use a 
chromosome-based system use a number of variations. If we look across the organ-
ismic world, there isn’t anything like an intrinsic and internal male or female essence 
of the type our intuitive psychological essentialism posits.
Second, let us consider human sex differences speci"cally. There are, of course, 
sex chromosomes in humans, where most males have the XY genotype and most 
females have the XX genotype (though there are exceptions). These sex chromo-
somes, for those already inclined toward essentializing sex and gender, may appear 
like natural candidates for playing the essence role of the relevant kinds. They are, 
after all, located deep within an organism, are already present in the embryo, and 
seem to draw a sharp boundary between the male and the female “type.” Are the 
sex chromosomes at least well suited to play the essence role for human males and 
females?
The answer is fairly clearly no. The sex chromosomes contain nothing like a 
“blueprint” for how males or females are “supposed” to develop under normal con-
ditions even with regard to the primary sexual organs or the sex differentiation in 
fetal testosterone levels we have encountered in Baron-Cohen’s work. Human pri-
mary sex differentiation is a complex process that involves many aspects of the 
genome interacting in complex ways (see Dupré, 1986, Fausto-Sterling, 2012; 
Keller, 2010). Gonadal sex differentiation, i.e., the development of testes and ova-
ries (which later end up being involved in the production of estrogen and testoster-
one), consists in a complex interaction of “two active and opposing signaling 
pathways” (DiNapoli & Capel, 2008, p.!4; cited also in Fausto-Sterling, 2012, p.!20) 
involving a variety of genes on several chromosomes blocking and enhancing each 
other. There is simply nothing like a gene that in some sense “stands for” the pro-
duction of the female or the male type of primary reproductive organs. Because sex 
differentiation is such a complex multifaceted process, there are no sharp boundar-
ies between the relevant types. And given the complex pathways leading, for exam-
ple, to various different levels of estrogen and testosterone production, there is no 
ground for, say, speaking of something “defective” or “abnormal” in a high level of 
testosterone in an XX fetus. Biological populations simply do not allow us to speak 
of something like “normal” types.17
To sum up, biological population thinking applied to men and women would pre-
cisely not speak of “essential” differences, or differences in the nature of men and 
women. Rather, it would speak of the statistical correlation between certain traits, 
variations within certain parts of human populations, and the complex interacting 
developmental pathways leading to the development of those traits.
17 We can, of course, speak of more or less “"t” organisms of a certain genotype, where such "tness 
would be related to the overall expected number of offspring. But that "tness will always depend 
on the speci"c environment and be relative to the overall population. An organism that has rela-




 Heritability Does Not Imply Genetic Causation
Let us move to another aspect of how psychological essentialism leads us astray. 
The psychological essentialist interpreter of “biology,” as we have seen, thinks of 
the essences that characterize social and biological kinds as heritable: they are inter-
nal features that an individual inherits from its biological parents, and which make 
it the kind of individual it is. The notion of a “heritable” difference between two 
groups of people, for the biological essentialist, therefore, is naturally understood as 
a difference that can be traced to a difference in an internal essence. Since differ-
ences in essences are understood as independent of environmental factors, someone 
in the grip of essentialism therefore intuitively interprets heritable differences as 
those that are independent of the environment, such as!– in the case of humans!– 
social or political factors.
Heritability is, indeed, an important biological notion. Yet, the biological notion 
of the heritability of a trait, like being good at empathizing or systemizing or show-
ing certain characteristic patterns of brain activation, does not entail that the devel-
opment of this trait is largely independent of environmental factors. The intuitive 
grip of psychological essentialism makes it easy to confuse the biological notion of 
the heritability of some trait with the notion that this trait is genetically determined 
(or rather determined by those mythical essences with which we tend to confuse 
genes) (see Lewontin, 1974 or Block, 1995. For some recent debate about how 
much about genetic causation can be determined by heritability analysis, see 
Sesardic, 2003, Oftedal, 2005).
The biological heritability of some trait is de"ned as the ratio of the genetic variation 
and the total variation with respect to that trait. Heritability is therefore only de"ned 
with respect to speci"c populations of organisms that differ in that trait. We can, for 
example, ask about the heritability of systemizing abilities in, say, the Norwegian pop-
ulation. But it makes no sense to ask whether, say, my  systemizing abilities are herita-
ble. The psychological essentialist in us wants to associate the biological notion of 
heritability, which applies to populations, with the notion that the heritable trait is in 
some form “given” like a legal inheritance “in the genes” (or essences) from a parent to 
its offspring. But the biological notion of heritability is completely silent on how the 
relevant trait is transmitted from one generation to the next.
A high degree of heritability for some trait difference therefore does not entail that 
the trait is in any sense genetically caused or determined (as I will show in the next 
section, it is highly unclear whether there in fact is a biologically acceptable notion 
of “genetically determined”). Ned Block (1995) illustrates this with an example 
closely tied to the gender differences we have been discussing. Suppose that in a 
certain population almost only women wear earrings. Most of these women will have 
XX chromosomes (I’ve brie#y touched on some of the complexities of sex differen-
tiation in the last section). In this population, the trait “wearing earrings” is highly 
heritable: the total variation with regard to the trait can almost all be “traced” to a 
genetic variation (having XX chromosomes as opposed to having XY chromo-
somes), and so the ratio of genetic variation and total variation will be close to one. 
Heritability will therefore be very high. This does absolutely not entail, though, 
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that XX chromosomes in some way, independently of cultural norms or the environ-
ment, “determine” that a developing person will wear earrings. Cultural norms may 
change, and have changed, and as a result, many men may also start wearing ear-
rings. As a result, the heritability of wearing earrings will now drop. In the new 
population, where it is fashionable for both men and women to wear earrings, the 
heritability of wearing earrings therefore is very low.
What holds for earrings also holds for systemizing and empathizing abilities. 
Suppose it were true that in a given population, e.g., today’s Norway, most women 
were much better empathizers than men. Given that most women differ from most 
men genetically, it would then follow that in this population, empathizing abilities 
are highly heritable, since most variation in the empathizing trait can be traced to a 
genetic difference and the ratio of genetic variation to total variation would be close 
to one. This, though, would do nothing to show that those abilities are in any inter-
esting sense genetically “determined.” A change in social structures, such as school-
ing or parenting, may well eliminate the empathizing differences or lead to their 
reversal. The biological heritability of the trait in one social setting is compatible 
with the trait not being heritable in a different social setting.
The quick association between heritability and genetic determination suggested 
to us by our intuitive psychological essentialism is, therefore, deeply mistaken.
 Genetic Causation Does Not Preclude Environmental Causation
Psychological essentialism, as we have seen, leads people to treat genes as separa-
ble and independent causes of appearances and behavior. When people view obesity 
as having a genetic cause, for example, they treat obesity as something that would 
develop independently of any environmental effects on obesity: the essence of obe-
sity is present in all individuals carrying the relevant gene. The environment acts 
only by either allowing or preventing the “normal” development of the carrier of the 
obesity gene, or by adding a further layer of statistical variation around the “norm” 
for that genotype. The essentialist treatment of the gene thus naturally leads to the 
view of genes as blueprints, in which the "nished “types” are already preformed. 
Lay people therefore easily accept the notion that there are genes “for” a large vari-
ety of traits, from blue eyes, and obesity, to empathizing or systemizing abilities.
But this way of thinking about genes is deeply mistaken.
First, it is controversial whether genes play any special role in development (cf. 
Oyama, 1985; Grif"th, & Gray, 1994;!Oyama, Grif"ths, & Gray, 2003). An organ-
ism’s development is in#uenced by a large variety of factors; DNA and RNA inter-
act with the various other molecules in the cellular matrix, in ways that are strongly 
dependent on the environment of each cell, be it temperature, various gradients of 
growth factors that cross cellular boundaries, to the nutrients in the cell’s or fetus’ 
ambient environment. As the fetus grows, the in#uence of intracellular (e.g., genetic) 
and extracellular (e.g., environmental) factors becomes even more heavily inter-
twined. This complex developmental process is fairly reliably replicated from one 
generation of the organism to the next. Those favoring a so-called developmental 
S. Watzl
65
systems approach (Oyama, 1985, Oyama et!al., 2003) hold that the various factors 
in the developmental process are on a par (they accept what has been called the 
“parity thesis”; Shea, 2011). The causal role of genes in the developmental process, 
according to this approach, is no different from the role of other intracellular molec-
ular factors or environmental factors. For example, we should treat the reliable rep-
lication of an organism’s environment that is shaped by the parental generation as in 
principle on a par with the replication of DNA from one generation to the next: a 
termite embryo, for example, in the same sense “inherits” the symbiotic bacteria 
that will help it break down cellulose for nutrition, the stable temperature of the 
termite mound, and the interactions of worker termites and its DNA.!Similarly, a 
human fetus “inherits” in the same sense social conditions, protective structures like 
houses, the stable temperature of its mother’s womb, and the DNA.! If the parity 
thesis advocated by the developmental systems approach is right, then there is noth-
ing!– specially not genes!– that can play the role of “biological differences” that can 
in any interesting sense be distinguished from other factors, speci"cally social fac-
tors. We would therefore reject any notion that genes play anything like the role of 
internal “essences” that “stand for” certain traits that a normally developing organ-
ism is “supposed to” develop.
Second, if even the developmental systems approach rejected, and genes are 
understood as playing a special role in development, they would still not play any-
thing like the role of “coding” for high-level features such as brain structures or 
systemizing capacities. Genes operate in complex regulatory networks, and!– uncon-
troversially! – code for enzymes that facilitate or suppress biochemical reactions, 
reactions that also depend on the environment, like which nutrients are available. 
The psychological essentialist in us likes to draw a distinction between those differ-
ences between us that are due to genes (the “biological differences”) and those that 
are due to the environment. But genes, through the production of enzymes that 
facilitate biochemical reactions, always produce their effects through their action on 
how one cell interacts with others and the environment: genes, as it were, “tell” the 
cell how to react to certain environments or changes in those environments. The 
question whether a difference is due to genes or due to the environment therefore 
makes little sense, as each effect of genes is mediated by environmental variables. 
Even if we therefore accept that genes are interestingly different from other causal 
factors, since they are “read’ by development (Shea, 2012) and “code’ or “stand for” 
certain things, what they stand for wouldn’t be anything like a trait like obesity, 
systemizing or empathizing abilities or even blue eyes, they would rather be instruc-
tions of something like the form “In conditions C1, do X1!” and “In conditions C2, 
do X2!” Given how genes actually operate, there therefore is no answer to the gen-
eral question of whether some difference is genetic or environmental (and there 
certainly is no answer to the question, whether, say, my empathizing abilities are 
genetic or environmentally caused).18
18 Lewontin (1974, p.!401) explains this point by reference to an analogy: “If two men lay bricks to 
build a wall, we may quite fairly measure their contributions by counting the number laid by each; 
but if one mixes the mortar and the other lays the bricks, it would be absurd to measure their rela-
tive quantitative contributions by measuring the volume of bricks and of mortar.”
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It is important not to misunderstand what I have just argued. It is compatible with 
the claim that genes are not separable causes and that it may be true that in a given 
environment or in a given range of environments, the difference between people 
with trait T1 and those with trait T2 can be well explained by a genetic difference 
between those people. It may well be true that, say, in the environment of contem-
porary Norway, a large amount of the variation in empathizing abilities is explained 
and caused by whether a fetus has XX or XY chromosomes (and other differences 
in sex-linked genes). This is compatible with a different effect of those sex-linked 
genes in a different environment. The sex-linked genes might, for example, act 
through the development of primary sexual organs, how caregivers and others react 
to babies with those primary sexual organs and how they then treat the baby. In a 
different environment (where caregivers react differently to babies with certain sex-
ual organs), the very same genes might have a very different effect. We therefore 
cannot conclude from the fact that a certain difference has a genetic cause that its 
effects cannot be dramatically altered through changes to the social and cultural set-
ting. The fact that a certain difference has a genetic explanation simply does not 
speak to whether that difference also has a social and cultural explanation.
Summing up this section: unlike the mythical essences with which psychological 
essentialism lets us identify genes, the causal effects of real genes cannot be sepa-
rated from environmental factors. The fact that a difference has a genetic explana-
tion does not preclude that it also has a social or cultural explanation.
 Hormone Levels Change and!Hard-Wired Brains May 
Be!Flexible
As we have seen, the psychological essentialist treatment of biological and social 
kinds, of biological heredity, and of the causal role of genes presents a deeply dis-
torted picture of biology.
Similar distortions result when statistically signi"cant differences in testosterone 
and estrogen hormone levels both in the fetus and later in life are interpreted as 
hormone levels of the male or the female “type.” As Fine (2017) shows in a detailed 
and accessible review, testosterone levels and their production in the gonads, for 
example, vary greatly both in males and females and are known to depend!– in both 
adult humans and other animals!– also on social factors. Androgen hormone levels 
do in#uence social factors, but they are also in#uenced by social factors in turn (see 
also Francis, Soma, & Fernald, 1993; Oliveira, Silva, & Canário, 2009). The impact 
of fetal testosterone levels on brain development and on future behavior is further 
highly complex and multifaceted, as Fine’s review shows in detail. There is simply 
no sense in which hormone levels either as a fetus or later in life can be well 
described as falling into a male or female “type.” The psychological essentialist 
treatment of hormones as immutable essences that specify the essence of the male 
or the female is deeply wrong with regard to how androgens operate in development 
and in how they are involved in shaping behavior.
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Similar problems also arise when the term “hard-wired” is used to describe 
aspects of the human (or other organisms’) brains, neurobiology, and also psychol-
ogy. The general idea behind this metaphor is that just like some aspects of the pos-
sible internal processing of a machine (including, but not exclusive to, computers) 
are wired into the hardware, and this impossible to change once the machine has 
been fully assembled, e.g., through software change in a computer, so some aspects 
of brain processing, or psychological processing, are wired into the very hardware 
of our brains. But on the re#ection, the “hard-wiring” metaphor just points us back 
to the problematic notions of a genetic blueprint. What is hard-wired into the brain 
is what cannot be changed once the brain (machine) is fully developed. But when is 
the brain “fully developed”? Certainly not at biological birth. Some aspects of a 
speci"c adult’s brain might be unchangeable then! but clearly are the product of 
learning and contingent brain development during youth (consider the acquisition of 
our native language).
One way to distinguish those aspects of our psychology that are “hard-wired” is 
to think of them as innate. Yet, while the notion of “innateness” "gured heavily in 
the early ethological research of researchers like Konrad Lorenz (1957 [1937]), who 
thought that innate characteristics could be revealed by deprivation experiments 
where an animal is supposed to be stripped of all relevant environmental input, the 
notion was already heavily critiqued in the 1960s so that, for example, one of the 
most in#uential ethologists Niko Tinbergen (who had worked closely with Lorenz 
in the 1940s) came to think that any such deprivation experiment could only show 
“which environmental aspect was … not to be in#uential” (Tinbergen, 1963, p.!424) 
and that the notion of innateness in the end was probably rather “heuristically harm-
ful” (ibid., p.!425). Today the notion of innateness is sometimes used in psychology 
(see Grif"ths, 2017 for a review). The notion of an innate characteristic may here 
just mean a characteristic that is universal in humans, one that is best studied by 
biology rather than psychology, one that is not learned on the basis of experience, or 
one that has been an evolutionary adaptation. None of these notions would imply 
that the development of an innate characteristic could not!heavily depend on the 
environment and social structures, in contrast to how psychological essentialism 
thinks about what is “within us.” Indeed, a growing number of biologists and phi-
losophers of biology follow Tinbergen and argue that the notion of innateness is 
problematic, confused, and of little scienti"c use (Grif"ths, Machery, & Linquist, 
2009; Mameli & Bateson, 2006; Moore, 2001): arguably it is a remnant of exactly 
the misleading essentialism that governs our intuitive way of thinking about the 
biological world that we have already discussed and has no interesting value in real 
developmental biology and psychology (cf. Grif"ths et!al., 2009). Whether or not 
that is true, any useful scienti"c notion of innate characteristics will be certain to 
avoid any link to the idea that those characteristics cannot be affected through social 
change or is essence determining.
Psychological essentialism thus also misleads us about the role of sex hormones 
as stable and determining characteristics of certain kinds of people, and it misleads 
us with regard to the distinction between what is innate and what is acquired.
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 Conclusion
Culture or biology? The question which of what is due to “biological differences” 
to many seems deep and important. Those who argue for an important role of “biol-
ogy” in the explanation of human differences often see “the science” on their side. 
I have argued that this is false!– on the interpretation of “biological differences” that 
is most intuitive and that makes the question appear to be most interesting. Defenders 
of “biology” have the science against them. What is often called “biology” is a 
myth: a myth created by an intuitive tendency that grotesquely distorts real biologi-
cal research.
I have argued that we are intuitively attracted to psychological essentialism, 
which let us interpret what is biological in distinguishing human kinds as what can 
be traced to the “essences” of the relevant kinds. On this interpretation, it would be 
deep and important to know what about, say, the differences between genders is 
biological: it would correspond to what is essential to being a man or being a 
woman and be opposed to what is a mere accidental feature that some women or 
some men have. Yet, I have also argued, the psychological essentialist understand-
ing of “biological differences” is also deeply mistaken about biology. It has the 
wrong conception of biological kinds, of biological heritability, and of how genes 
and hormones work.
Does this mean that everything about us can be affected through social changes? 
Of course not. But instead of confusing the public debate by asking what is due to 
biology or nature, we should rather directly discuss the complex causal explanation 
of, for example, how the genders end up in different types of occupation (at a par-
ticular time, in a particular culture) and which types of interventions are effective. 
The answers will probably be complex. We will need a good deal of biological 
understanding to discuss them productively. And we will need a good deal of social 
science. But the idea that we can sidestep the complexities by instead asking about 
nature vs nurture rests on a mistaken conception of the biological world. Responsible 
research and public debate about biology would avoid any talk of biological differ-
ence, of nature vs nurture, of types of brains or people, and probably also of whether 
there are genes for this, that, or the other.
The unconscious appeal of the essentialist picture contributes an explanation to 
why we fall so easily for the “mirage of a space between nature and nurture,” as 
Evelyn Fox Keller (2010) has put it. When we start to debate the relative contributions 
of “nature” and “nurture” or the importance of “biological differences” in the explana-
tion of some social patterns, we most likely have already fallen into the trap that our 
essentialist inclinations have set up for us. Those on the biology repulsion side of the 
debate are right that “biology” is associated with an outmoded, false, and socially 
explosive way of thinking about humans, namely, the essentialist picture. But the only 
way to move beyond that is biological literacy: we should follow the biological 
attracted in their appeal for better education in real biological mechanisms and the real 
science of human evolution. More biology, there is reason to hope, will let us move 
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